Here is Part 4 and the last in the series of articles (Part 1, 2, 3 & 4) continuing the theme concerning 6G and the challenging situations concerning the impact of the changing characteristics of technology advancement that needs constant assessment if evidence from it placed in legal proceedings is to be understood to be trustworthy and reliable.
1. Introduction
The Forensic Science Regulator (FSR) Code of Practice and UKAS accreditation frameworks play a crucial role in ensuring the credibility of Cell Site Analysis (CSA) and Radio Frequency Propagation Surveys (RFPS) in legal proceedings. However, current forensic guidance does not adequately address the challenges introduced by 5G and 6G technologies, such as:
- Beamforming and massive MIMO dynamically altering signal propagation.
- Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces (RIS) redirecting and modifying radio waves.
- Network slicing and AI-driven coverage optimizations, which challenge traditional location estimations.
- Hybrid RF and optical wireless transmission, which complicates forensic analysis.
This proposal outlines key updates needed to ensure scientific validity, forensic reliability, and legal defensibility of CSA methodologies under FSR and UKAS standards.
2. Identified Shortcomings in Existing FSR and UKAS Standards
(A) Over-Reliance on Legacy RFPS Methods
- Issue: Current CSA methodologies rely on static RF propagation models, which are invalid in 5G/6G due to real-time network optimizations and RIS-controlled signal redirections.
- Proposal: Replace traditional RF surveys with real-time network state reconstructions using AI and machine learning models.
(B) Lack of Standardized 5G/6G-Specific Forensic Guidelines
- Issue: FSR and UKAS do not define forensic best practices for beam-level signal tracking, network slicing variations, or RIS effects.
- Proposal: Introduce 5G/6G forensic network logging requirements, including: RIS controller logs (to verify whether signals were redirected artificially). 5G Core (5GC) beam identity logs (for precise forensic location analysis). Angle of Arrival (AoA) and Timing Advance (TA) data to replace outdated distance estimation methods.
(C) Absence of Legal Considerations for RIS and Beamforming Effects
- Issue: CSA experts are not required to account for RIS-assisted multipath reflections or beam reconfigurations, which can mislead forensic conclusions.
- Proposal: Forensic reports must explicitly state whether RIS or beamforming was active in the analysed area and how it could affect forensic location accuracy.
3. Proposed Updates to FSR and UKAS Frameworks
(A) Introduce Real-Time Network Logging Standards
- Require forensic investigators to collect 5GC logs, RIS configuration changes, and beamforming adjustments alongside CDRs.
- Why? These logs provide a more accurate forensic reconstruction of network conditions at the time of an event.
(B) Mandatory AI-Assisted RF Environment Reconstruction
- Develop AI-based forensic models to account for dynamic network changes, beam selection, and RIS interference.
- Why? RF surveys conducted after an event are unreliable if the network has since re-optimized itself.
(C) Update CSA Accreditation Criteria for 5G/6G
- UKAS accreditation should require: Validation of forensic methodologies against 5G/6G network behaviours. Training for forensic analysts on RIS, beamforming, and hybrid RF/FSO transmission effects.
- Why? Ensuring analysts are competent in modern wireless technologies is critical for maintaining CSA reliability in court.
(D) Legal and Courtroom Adaptations
- Courts must recognize that traditional RFPS and CDR-based CSA alone are insufficient for 5G/6G forensic analysis.
- Prosecutors and defence teams must be trained in RIS-related forensic principles to effectively challenge or defend CSA evidence.
4. Conclusion
- FSR and UKAS forensic standards must evolve to reflect 5G/6G complexities.
- Real-time network logs, AI-based reconstructions, and RIS metadata must replace outdated CSA methodologies.
- Failure to update forensic standards risks wrongful convictions or acquittals due to inaccurate CSA evidence.
This proposal serves as a roadmap for integrating scientifically defensible forensic CSA methodologies into FSR and UKAS frameworks, ensuring continued legal and evidential credibility in the 5G/6G era.
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The research background for the above suggested framework is posited on the premise of the following considerations:
6G (and 5G for that matter) concerns about evidence credibility in CSA/RFPS under FSR and UKAS requirements are well-founded. The Forensic Science Regulator (FSR) Code of Practice and UKAS accreditation frameworks still rely on methodologies that do not fully account for 5G/6G-specific challenges like beamforming, RIS-assisted signal paths, and dynamic network reconfigurations.
Key Issues in FSR & UKAS Standards for CSA
1️ FSR’s CSA Guidance Acknowledges CSA Limitations but Does Not Address 5G/6G Realities
- The FSR Code (FSR-C-135) recognizes that pinpointing a mobile device’s exact location is almost always impossible, especially when survey results for different locations are too similar to differentiate.
- However, it still assumes that RFPS remains a viable forensic tool without accounting for 5G/6G technologies like RIS and beamforming, which fundamentally alter propagation conditions.
2️ Quality Management Focus in the FSR Code Does Not Extend to 5G/6G-Specific Validation
- The FSR’s broader forensic regulation mandates validation of forensic methods, quality control procedures, and accreditation to ISO 17025.
- But there is no reference to 5G/6G-specific forensic methodologies, meaning that legacy methods (CDR analysis, RF surveys, and basic cell mapping) remain dominant—even if they are increasingly unreliable.
3️ FSR’s CSA Strategy Lacks Consideration of RIS, Beamforming, and AI-Driven Network Optimization
- The CSA forensic strategy requirements mention location surveys, cell mapping, and area differentiation, but these are based on legacy network architectures where signal paths are more predictable.
- The framework does not require forensic practitioners to account for RIS-assisted redirections, multipath distortions, or network-controlled optimizations, which are critical in 5G/6G cases.
4️ UKAS Accreditation Criteria Do Not Address Emerging CSA Challenges
- UKAS requires forensic providers to comply with ISO 17025, which ensures scientific rigor and repeatability.
- However, if the underlying forensic methodologies themselves are outdated, accreditation alone does not solve the problem.
- There is no mention of AI-assisted forensic reconstructions, RIS metadata analysis, or beam-level connectivity tracking, all of which are required for forensic accuracy in 6G.
What This Means for CSA/RFPS Credibility in Court
⚠️Risk of Scientific Challenges in Legal Cases – Defence could argue that CSA methodologies fail to meet modern scientific standards and should be deemed unreliable.
⚠️Potential Miscarriages of Justice – Investigators relying on outdated techniques may draw incorrect conclusions, leading to wrongful convictions or acquittals.
⚠️Need for Updated Forensic Standards – FSR and UKAS must integrate 5G/6G forensic principles to maintain the credibility of mobile forensic investigations.
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Final thoughts. Any disagreement that there is no connection between CSA/RFPS and FSR and UKAS merely raises the conundrum why did these bodies specifically mention CSA/RFPS in their public-facing documents if only ever generalised procedures and common accreditation standardized processes were needed? Answer! Because both FRS and UKAS are seeking to have trust in (a) the evidence acquisition, (b) rigours testing and (c) analysis in the entire (d) end-to-end applied methodology.
This last article in a series of four parts continues on from the three discussions posted:
Forensic Challenges in 6G Cell Site Analysis (CSA) and Radio Frequency Propagation Surveys (RFPS) - https://cellsiteanalysis.blogspot.com/2025/04/forensic-challenges-in-6g-cell-site.html
Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces (RIS) and forensic implications in 6G CSA (Part 1) - https://cellsiteanalysis.blogspot.com/2025/04/reconfigurable-intelligent-surfaces-ris.html
Cell ID detection in RIS-aided communications (Part 2): 6G Cell Site Analysis (CSA) and Radio Frequency Propagation Surveys (RFPS) - https://cellsiteanalysis.blogspot.com/2025/04/cell-id-detection-in-ris-aided.html
Forensic Adaptations for Cell Site Analysis (CSA) in RIS-Based 6G Networks (Part 3): 6G Cell Site Analysis (CSA) and RFPS - https://cellsiteanalysis.blogspot.com/2025/04/here-is-part-3-in-series-of-articles.html
